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ARTICLE 2 AND RELATIONAL SALES
CONTRACTS
Richard E. Speidel *
I. SOME ISSUES IN THE PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
The official text of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 (Sales) is
thirty-five years old. Several important developments in and around the
law of sales since 1957 justify revision of Article 2.1 A revision process
that will determine the future of Article 2 is now underway.2
In addition to other developments, two important theoretical ap-
proaches to contract law have blossomed in the last thirty-five years.
The first is economic analysis, with its emphasis on promoting efficient
bargains, actual or hypothetical, at the time of contracting and thereafter
protecting the ex ante bargain from the erosion of time and tide. The
second is relational contract theory, with its emphasis on deterring op-
portunistic behavior within and adjusting or preserving relationships in
light of changing circumstances after the time of contracting.3 Because a
* Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., 1954,
Denison University; J.D., 1957, University of Cincinnati; LL.M., 1958, Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law. The author is reporter to a drafting committee appointed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) to revise Uniform Commer-
cial Code Article 2. The views expressed in this Essay are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the drafting committee, the NCCUSL or anyone else associ-
ated with the revision process.
1. For example: (1) Consumer protection legislation, such as the Federal Magnuson-
Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat.
2183 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), and state "lemon" and deceptive
trade practices laws have been enacted; (2) computer technology, such as Electronic Data
Interchange, has revolutionized communication between trading partners; (3) indirect market-
ing through vertical contracts has become widespread, with multimedia advertising promoting
many commercial and most consumer products; (4) different, complex transaction types, such
as the sale, lease or license of computer systems, have evolved; (5) a growing service economy
has challenged the scope and importance of Article 2, and the benefits of leasing rather than
buying goods have prompted the preparation of a new Article 2A; and (6) the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987), became effective in
the United States in 1988.
2. Debora L. Threedy, Liquidated and Limited Damages and the Revision of Article 2:
An Opportunity to Rethink the UC.C. s Treatment of Agreed Remedies, 27 IDAHO L. REV.
427, 427 (1990).
3. See infra part III.
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full contingent bargain is unlikely, the emphasis is on events and conduct
ex post, rather than agreement ex ante, contract formation.
Although there are overlaps, at the extremes these theories prescribe
radically different models of contract liability and remedy. The former,
with its attention to the parties' ex ante bargain, fits comfortably into
consent-based, bargain-oriented, "neo-classical" contract doctrine. The
latter, with its attention to events ex post contract, does not.
Admittedly, it is difficult to discuss one development without con-
fronting the other. Nevertheless, in this Essay, I propose to discuss the
characteristics and normative importance of relational contracts and
pose, without answering, some difficult questions for the revision of Arti-
cle 2. The ultimate question is whether the "gap fillers" and principles of
liability and remedy in Article 2 should be revised to better respond to
the realities of relational sales contracts.
II. LIMITED RELATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ARTICLE 2
Article 2 deals with the agreed exchange between two or more per-
sons of goods for a price-the contract for sale of goods. It is a legisla-
tive exception to the common law of contracts for a particular
transaction. It assumes that contracts for the sale of goods require differ-
ent legal treatment.
A. Context
Article 2 clearly responds to the context within which the contract
for sale is to be performed. For example, Article 2 does not distinguish
among different types of goods.5 Thus, contracts for the sale of a horse, a
new car, a custom-designed computer system or natural gas, are subject
to the same rules and standards. Differences generated by types of goods
are expected to emerge in the agreement of the parties, "gap fillers" sup-
plied by the court, and standards designed to regulate formation, per-
formance and enforcement. To this degree, the contract for sale is rooted
in, and responsive to, a relevant commercial context and the parties'
course of dealing and performance. In the absence of a clear and com-
4. The argument is that contract law in general, and sales law in particular, should in
most cases, be responsive to the realities of exchange transactions in context. If there is an
arbitrary divergence between law and reality, the law will have less impact on the behavior of
the parties as they plan, perform and resolve disputes arising under the bargain. See Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1984).
5. Nor does it distinguish among different types of sellers and buyers. Except for
merchant sellers and buyers, the principles of liability and remedy are the same for all.
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plete agreement, lawyers and judges are expected to search for "imma-
nent" external norms in the commercial context.6
B. Types of Contracts
Article 2 does not sharply distinguish among different types of con-
tracts to sell goods. It applies to bargains of short duration made in func-
tioning markets where the parties have agreed to all material terms. It
also applies to relational contracts, such as bargains of longer duration
that are somewhat idiosyncratic. Because the parties have not agreed to
all terms, relational contracts also rely on the exercise of discretion re-
served by one or both parties and continuing efforts by the parties to
cooperate and to adjust to changes in the relationship. Article 2 re-
sponds to some of the characteristics of relational contracts, but the re-
sponse is both implicit and, arguably, incomplete.7
C. Governance Structures
Finally, Article 2 has little, if anything, to say about the agreed
structure, if any, for governing performance or adjustment of the con-
tract for sale.8 These structures range from organizing the parties into a
single maximizing unit9 to maintaining separateness and relying primar-
ily on the market to preserve the relationship and the courts to resolve
disputes. These structures may take the form of model trading partner
agreements, franchise and distribution contracts, and clauses devised by
the parties to long-term contracts to adjust to change. They also include
dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration and mediation. To
6. This approach, attributable to the jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn, has been criticized
as resting on a "triad of dubious assumptions that self-evident ideal resolutions of situational
problems exist, that they can be discovered by careful scrutiny of actual situations, and that
once articulated they will be widely accepted." Richard Danzig; A Comment on the Jurispru-
dence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 635 (1975); see also James J.
White, Promise Fulfilled and Principle Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SuRv, AM. L. 7 (discussing legal
realist body of thought and effect on contract law).
7. See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, An Empirical View of Relational Contracts Under Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 293, 303 (concluding that
cases reported since UCC's inception until 1987 show "predominance of discrete over rela-
tional contracts" in litigated cases).
8. One commentator defines governance structure as the "institutional framework within
which the integrity of a transaction is decided." Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Eco-
nomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 235 (1979). Transac-
tion-cost economics involves the choices among "alternative institutional modes for organizing
transactions." Id. at 234.
9. This structure removes the transaction from the market and, through internal organi-
zation, manages decision making under common ownership and "with the assistance of hierar-
chical incentive and control systems." Id. at 237.
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the extent that these mechanisms provide content and meaning to the
exchange itself, they are incorporated by the UCC's broad definition of
agreement.10 To the extent that they accomplish other objectives, they
are beyond the direct scope of Article 2.
In sum, Article 2 deals primarily with the agreed exchange of goods
for a price. In the absence of agreed governance structures, it says very
little about mechanisms for resolving disputes or for adjusting or preserv-
ing the relationship. 1
III. RELATIONAL CONTRACTS AND REVISED ARTICLE 2
The characteristics and importance of relational contracts have been
discussed extensively by such scholars as Ian Macneil, Oliver William-
son, Stewart Macaulay, Victor Goldberg and Robert Scott. 12 Identifying
characteristics is mainly a task of description. Assessing importance,
however, has normative implications. The argument is that relational
contracts, because of their characteristics, may, at a minimum, require
different "gap fillers" and principles of liability and remedy than more
discrete sales contracts. 3
A. The Problem of Norms
1. Relational theory
The degree to which a contract is relational depends upon the pres-
ence of some or all of the characteristics discussed below. Most notable
are whether "(1) the transaction extends over time, (2) parts of the ex-
change cannot be measured or specified precisely [at the time of con-
tracting], and (3) the interdependence of the parties to the exchange
extends at any given moment beyond any single discrete transaction to a
range of social interrelationships."' 4
10. See infra part III.A.2.
11. For example, U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1990) protects a modification made in good faith, but
the UCC says nothing about the duty of the parties to negotiate in good faith toward the
modification. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) provides limited relief for changed circumstances, but it says
nothing about whether that relief should be discharge of the contract or adjustment and con-
tinued performance.
12. See generally Symposium, Law, Governance, and Continuing Relationships, 1985 Wis.
L. REv. 461, 483-579 (discussing relational contracts). The existence and importance of rela-
tional contracts in the real world has also been verified in an interesting empirical study. See
Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1, 16-24.
13. See, &g., Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Re-
quirement: Once More into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 39-57 (1987) (arguing that relational
theory supports abolition of privity defense in warranty disputes under Article 2).
14. Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Resurrection of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 184, 190
(1982) (reviewing IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MOD-
[Vol. 26:789
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Ian Macneil has identified norms that are necessary to hold the rela-
tionship together-such as solidarity, reciprocity and role integrity-and
other norms that may be generated by party behavior over time-such as
those supporting cooperation, risk sharing and preserving the relation-
ship. These are norms internal to the relationship. The "is" of actual
behavior becomes the "ought" by which the relationship is governed.
These internal norms are reinforced when they can be harmonized by
external norms-such as the "oughts" generated by the behavior of
others similarly situated-but they are not dependent upon
harmonization.15
Perhaps these internal norms function well without the intervention
of courts. Nevertheless, if relational theory is to be more than a body of
nonlegal principles and sanctions, the internal norms must become part
of the contract.
2. Article 2: The definition of agreement
The broad definition of "agreement" in UCC section 1-201(3) is, at
first blush, consistent with relational contracting. The bargain in fact of
the parties is found in "language or by implication from other circum-
stances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of per-
formance." 6 The sources from which agreement can be inferred are also
defined. 7 The question is whether these definitions are broad enough to
incorporate internal norms generated by the relationship, such as cooper-
ation or risk sharing, into the agreement.
For example, suppose the parties are in the fourth renewal of a five-
year contract for sale. The written agreement is silent on whether there
ERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980)). See infra part III.C for a discussion of the charac-
teristics of a relational contract.
15. For a concise summary of relational contract theory, see Ian R. Macneil, Relational
Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INSTITU-
TIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 273-76 (1987) [hereinafter Macneil, Relational Contract
Theory]. See also IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEw SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MOD-
ERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 37 (1980) (arguing that "[o]nly when the societal norm re-
flects desires to stamp out or curtail contracts can the external [norms] differ fundamentally
from the internal [norms]"); Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social
Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567, 568 (1986) (arguing that "no pattern of exchange merely enhances
individual utility respecting goods being exchanged, and all patterns of exchange accepted by
all parties enhance solidarity"); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not
Know, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 483 (arguing that complex patterns of human interaction are neces-
sary components in any accurate account of legal development). But see Randy E. Barnett,
Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REv.
1175 (1992) (arguing that there are ambivalences and ambiguities in Macneil's writings).
16. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
17. See id. §§ 1-205, 2-208.
April 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
is a duty to negotiate in good faith in light of changed circumstances, and
there is no applicable trade usage. In the past fifteen years, the parties
willingly negotiated in good faith when an unanticipated change oc-
curred on ten occasions. In the second year of the fourth renewal, one
party refuses to negotiate despite changed circumstances and threatens to
terminate the relationship. The other claims a breach of contract.
Relational theory would identify and assess the parties' pattern of
behavior over time (the "is") and, in all probability, conclude that their
behavior produced an internal norm of cooperation and adjustment (the
"ought"). Taking the next step, one might conclude that the norm be-
came a term of the contract and that a failure to negotiate is a breach.
UCC section 1-205(1), however, might not permit this last step: "A
course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to
a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct." 8 There is no written "expression" to interpret, and the
issue is not simply how to interpret the pattern of conduct. Rather, the
question is whether a refusal to engage in that conduct, properly inter-
preted, is improper.19 Although UCC section 1-205(3) states that a
course of dealing is relevant to "give particular meaning to and supple-
ment or qualify terms of the agreement,"2 the emphasis is still on some
"term." Thus, the pattern of previous conduct is, arguably, relevant to
interpreting or supplementing a term in the agreement, not to supplying
that term.21
A possible argument is that the definition of "agreement" is not nec-
essarily limited by the definition of "prior course of dealing" found in
UCC section 1-205. If an agreement under UCC section 1-201(3) to ne-
gotiate in good faith is found by "implication" from the parties' course of
dealing, it is a term of the agreement to be interpreted under UCC sec-
tion 1-205. Although this reaches the correct relational result, the path
to that outcome could be smoothed by appropriate clarification.22
18. Id. § 1-205(1) (emphasis added).
19. See id. § 2-208(1).
20. Id. § 1-205(3).
21. See, e.g., Crescent Oil & Shipping Servs. v. Phibro Energy, Inc., 929 F.2d 49, 52 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that trade usage and course of performance are relevant to interpretation
of term in writing).
22. See Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103,
123-27 (1988) (discussing broad reading of "agreement"); Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment
for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, "Express Terms, " and Consistency Under Section 1-205
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777, 782 (1986) (expressing view that
potential of U.C.C. § 1-205 has not been realized); see also David Chamy, Hypothetical Bar-





Both relationalists and transaction-cost economists recognize the
importance of preventing opportunism in relational contracts. Opportu-
nism rears its ugly head when one party departs from the internally gen-
erated norms of the relationship, whether they be the primary norms of
reciprocity and solidarity or the supplementary norms of cooperation
and risk sharing, to engage in conduct motivated primarily by self inter-
est. It may occur to exploit transaction-specific investments made by the
other party, to recapture gains implicitly allocated at the time of con-
tracting or to exploit internal or external changes that occur during per-
formance. According to Macneil, opportunism is "[s]elf-interest seeking
contrary to the principles of the relation in which it occurs."23
In short, opportunism threatens the relationship. If the contract
does not have a governance structure to regulate or define opportunism,
or if that structure fails and the parties cannot agree, a court may be
asked to intervene. It is at this point that the responsiveness of contract
law in general, and Article 2 in particular, to the relational contract may
be tested. More particularly, the question is whether the allegedly oppor-
tunistic conduct is permitted or constitutes a "breach" of the relational
contract.
2. Article 2: Scope of good faith duty
The UCC imposes a duty of good faith in the "performance or en-
forcement"24 of contracts. The duty of good faith, however, is immuta-
ble: The parties cannot avoid it by agreement, although it can be
(1991) (suggesting that courts use "hypothetical bargain" framework to interpret ambiguous
language, to supply implied duties in face of contingency that no language in contract ad-
dresses, and to supply terms of effective but incomplete agreement).
23. Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the
Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1018, 1024 n.20 (1981); see
also Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 IOwA L. REV. 1, 24 (1981) (noting that opportunism recaptures gains
"foregone at the time of contracting"); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law
of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1981) (stating that opportunism is behavior by party
A that is contrary to party B's understanding, but not necessarily contrary to explicit terms of
agreement, and that results in transfer of resources); Williamson, supra note 8, at 234 n.3
(stating that opportunism is variety of self-interest seeking that "extends simple self-interest
seeking to include self-interest seeking with guile").
24. U.C.C. § 1-102.
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defined.25 Because good faith is an imposed term of the agreement,2 6 bad
faith, however defined, is a breach of contract.
a. internal norms
The current definition of good faith does not confront a common
form of opportunism in relational contracts, which is self-interest-seeking
contrary to the internal norms of the relationship. UCC section 1-203
states that "every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement. ' 27 UCC section 1-
201(19) provides a subjective definition of good faith: "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned."28 UCC section 2-103(1)(b), how-
ever, adds an objective element: Good faith "in the case of a merchant
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards offair dealing in the trade. 29 Under this definition, bad faith is a
failure to conform to external trade standards of fair dealing, rather than
to norms generated by the relationship itself. If the internal norms are
part of the agreement, a deviation can be handled as a conventional
breach of contract. If internal norms are apart from the agreement, they
must conform to external trade norms before a deviation is considered
bad faith."0
In contrast, revised Article 3, in UCC section 3-103(a)(4), now de-
fines good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.' 13 Note that the objective standard
applies to everyone and the phrase "in the trade" has been deleted. Ar-
guably, the source of the relevant commercial standards could be the
relationship itself.
An even better definition of good faith might provide as follows:
Good faith "means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
[commercial] standards of fair dealing in the conduct or transaction in-
25. Although the obligation of good faith "may not be disclaimed by agreement.., the
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obliga-
tions is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." Id. § 1-102(3).
26. See Christine L. Kunz, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A Functional Approach Within the
UCC, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1105 (1990).
27. U.C.C. § 1-203.
28. Id. § 1-201(19).
29. Id. § 2-103(1)(b) (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 360 (Wash. 1991) (holding that
unless agreement so provided, bank had no good faith duty to consider debtor's proposal for
loan restructuring, even though parties' course of dealing was consistent with such considera-
tion, and stating that there was no "free-floating" duty of good faith unattached to terms of
underlying legal document).
31. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4).
[Vol. 26:789
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volved." A comment could state that "sometimes good faith is the basis
for proscribing behavior that violates basic standards of decency, either
generally or in the particular conduct of the transaction involved. Exam-
ples include, but are not limited to, the use of subterfuges and eva-
sions."'32 This definition supports a finding of bad faith (opportunism)
when one party's conduct deviates from internal norms generated by the
relationship and, if adopted, would be a better response to the problems
of opportunism in relational contracts.
b. precontract negotiations
Under the current version of Article 1, the good faith duty applies to
the "performance and enforcement" of the contract but not to precon-
tract negotiations.33 Unless there is an agreement sharing risks or defin-
ing responsibilities in bargaining, claims of opportunistic behavior before
the contract is formed are beyond the scope of the UCC.34
From a relational perspective, this line is softened somewhat by the
ease with which parties can conclude a contract for sale without agreeing
on all material terms. Parties can conclude a contract with incomplete or
indefinite terms "if [they] have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."'35 A com-
pletely contingent contract is not required, but if there is no such mani-
fested mutual intent, the opportunistic conduct of one party in
withdrawing from negotiations that have not quite concluded a bargain is
neither a breach of contract nor bad faith.
This seemingly artificial exclusion has been sharply criticized by
Professor Shell, who develops a model of potential liability in precontract
negotiations based upon trust rather than good faith.36 Whatever the
source of the restraint, in the revision process the drafters should pay
32. This proposed definition of good faith follows that proposed by Professor E. Allan
Farnsworth to a committee of the American Bar Association's Business Law Section, which is
considering possible revisions of UCC Article 1. Letter from William B. Davenport & Harry
C. Sigman, Co-Chairs, UCC Article 1 Review Task Force, ABA Section of Business Law, to
Members of Task Force 1 (Dec. 10, 1992) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
33. U.C.C. § 1-203.
34. Id. Most commentators oppose the extension of contract principles to this setting.
See, eg., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1987); see also Randy E. Barnett &
Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepre-
sentation, 15 HorSTRA L. RFv. 443 (1987) (opting for tort solution).
35. U.C.C. § 2-204(3). The "offer-acceptance" model of contract formation, however, still
undergirds Article 2. See id. §§ 2-205 to -207.
36. See G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiatidn of Commercial Con-
tracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221 (1991).
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careful attention to the importance of relational norms, regardless of the
formal rules of contract formation.
In sum, internal norms may be generated by an exchange relation-
ship in the negotiations before and in the performance after a contract is
formed. If these internal norms are to be protected against opportunism,
the definition of good faith should be expanded to incorporate them and
its scope extended to precontractual negotiations.
C Characteristics of Relational Contracts
What is a relational contract? Macneil has identified several charac-
teristics of relational contracts, broadly conceived." Many of these ap-
pear in long-term contracts for the sale of goods. I will note the
relational characteristic and then pose the issues that might be consid-
ered in the revision of Article 2.
1. Extended duration
a characteristics
Relational contracts continue over an extended period of time. The
exchange relationship may consist of a series of contracts between the
same parties over an indefinite period, or it may be expressed as, say, a
twenty-year contract for the supply of goods. Alternatively, the ex-
tended relationship may involve others, such as suppliers, sureties, cus-
tomers and banks. In short, patterns of interaction and expectation
develop that transcend the boundaries of the traditional discrete bargain.
b. issue
Extended duration reduces the likelihood that the parties will be
able or willing to agree on all material terms at the time of contracting.
It increases the need for one or both parties to have discretion in per-
formance as the contract unfolds." Extended duration also raises the
question of when the relationship terminates. In cases in which there is
no agreed time limit or method of termination, UCC section 2-309 states
that the contract is "valid for a reasonable time"39 but that either party
can terminate "at any time [upon] reasonable notification" to the other
party. °
37. See Macneil, Relational Contract Theory, supra note 15, at 273-76.
38. The consequences of extended duration are well discussed in Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
39. U.C.C. § 2-309(2).
40. Id. § 2-309(3).
[Vol. 26:789
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The revision issue is whether termination at will with a "reasonable
notification" requirement adequately protects the reliance interests of the
parties and those persons who interact with them. For example, if an
internal norm favors preserving the relationship and one party has made
transaction-specific investments, does a statutory limitation that a termi-
nation notice must be "reasonable" adequately control opportunism or
measure when the norms of reciprocity and solidarity have deteriorated?
Arguably, an unadorned standard of reasonableness is too slender a reed
for the relational contract.
2. Open terms and reserved discretion
a. characteristics
One consequence of extended relationships is that the participants
neither intend nor expect to see the whole future relationship presen-
tiated at any single time. They view the exchange as an ongoing integra-
tion of behavior that will grow and vary with events in a largely
unforeseeable future. Thus, the parties may intentionally leave impor-
tant terms open, or explicitly "agree to agree" in the future. Or, they
may reserve to one or both parties discretion to be exercised during per-
formance. Thus, the agreement may say nothing about price, or the
seller may be given discretion to fix the price. Similarly, the seller may
agree to supply "output," the buyer may agree to purchase "require-
ments," or, in an exclusive dealing contract, one or both may agree to use
"best efforts."
A consequence of open or flexible terms or reserved discretion, is
that the contract "tracks the market" over time. It shares rather than
divides market risk.4" The standard of performance or allocation of risk
is judged by behavior and conditions at the time of performance, rather
than by fixed terms agreed ex ante contract.
b. issue
The current Article 2 seemingly responds well to open terms and
reserved discretion in long-term contracts. Section 2-204(3) provides
that "[e]ven though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
41. See Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REv.
527 (noting that incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior increases as divergence between
contract price and market alternatives increases).
April 1993]
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remedy."'42 In addition, Part 3 of Article 2 supplies a variety of terms to
fill gaps in the agreement, and the duty of good faith in the performance
of the contract regulates the exercise of reserved discretion by one or
both parties.43
Nevertheless, there are several lurking issues. For example, are the
"gap fillers" in Part 3 of Article 2 appropriate for relational contracts?
Suppose the parties have agreed to agree on a price, but fail to do so
because of one party's opportunistic behavior. What happens next?
Under UCC section 2-305(l)(a), if the parties intended to be bound, even
though they do not agree to a price, the price is a "reasonable price at the
time for delivery."'  But UCC section 2-305(1) seems to assume that the
relationship will terminate and the dispute will go to litigation. Nothing
is said about the probability that a long-term contract will continue de-
spite the failure to agree or the manner in which one party's opportunis-
tic behavior is to be treated. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the phrase
"reasonable price at the time for delivery" is sufficient to ensure that the
market risk is shared as the parties intended. In short, UCC section 2-
305 is both incomplete and too sparse to deal with all of the relational
complexity.
Suppose further that one party's opportunistic behavior in failing to
negotiate is treated as a breach. What is the appropriate remedy if the
nonbreaching party wants the exchange to continue and this is supported
by relational norms? An ideal remedy is a decree of specific perform-
ance, with the court either supplying a price term to fill the "gap" or
attempting to facilitate agreement by the parties.4" Although Article 2
does not foreclose this relief, it does nothing to facilitate or encourage
it." Without an inspired leap of equitable faith, there is a real risk that
42. U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
43. See, eg., id. §§ 2-305(2), -306(1), 1-203.
44. Id § 2-305(1)(a).
45. See Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio 1990). The parties,
under a very long-term contract, agreed that they "shall mutually agree" upon a rate for the
transportation of iron ore if an external price standard failed. Id. at 516. The external stan-
dard failed and the parties, apparently due to the reluctance of the shipper, failed to agree. Id.
at 517. The court, without stating that the shipper had breached the contract, granted specific
performance and ordered the appointment of a mediator if the parties were unable to agree on
a rate. Id. at 521. If the mediator failed to obtain agreement, the court reserved the power to
fill the gap. Id.
46. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) states that specific performance "may be decreed where the goods
are unique or in other proper circumstances," and U.C.C. § 2-716(2) provides that the "decree
for specific performance may include such terms and conditions as to payment of the price,
damages, or other relief as the court may deem just." Thus, the legislative framework is barely
adequate for a court with a relational perspective.
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the relationship will terminate or fail for "indefiniteness" under UCC
section 2-204(3).
3. Future cooperative behavior is expected and, perhaps, facilitated
by agreed governance mechanisms
a. characteristics
In contracts with an extended duration, in which terms are open or
flexible or discretion is reserved, it is expected that change generated by
internal events or circumstances external to the relationship may require
both parties to cooperate in sharing risks or making needed adjustments.
Thus, if an external price-fixing mechanism fails to operate or a term in
the contract fails of its essential purpose, the parties may agree to negoti-
ate in good faith or to submit the problem to arbitration or mediation
while continuing performance. Or, the agreement may contemplate
shared decision making to maximize joint profits, as if the parties were a
single entity.
b. issue
Under Article 2, an expectation of future cooperative behavior is
enforceable when that expectation is expressed in an agreement. In the
absence of agreement or an applicable statute, there is no duty to negoti-
ate in good faith, much less agree, and, of course, there is no duty to
arbitrate or mediate unless agreed. Fortunately, the broad definition of
agreement may incorporate such a duty in some cases.47 But, as dis-
cussed previously,4" that definition may not pick up relevant norms gen-
erated by the relationship itself.
The issue, for relational contracts at least, is whether this position
should be reversed. For example, should revised Article 2 provide that,
unless otherwise agreed, the parties to a relational contract have a duty
to negotiate in good faith to preserve or adjust the relationship in the face
of changed circumstances? This duty would be justified by the nature of
the contract rather than by agreement and would require some explica-
tion of when the duty arises, what is bad faith bargaining, and what are
the consequences of failing to negotiate in good faith. Although these
issues are difficult, they are responsive to recurring characteristics in rela-
tional contracting. The question is whether these default rules for rela-
47. See Robert A. Hiliman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (making most of broad definition of agree-
ment in U.C.C. § 1-201(3)).
48. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
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tional contracts reflect terms to which the parties probably would have
agreed if they had bargained over them.49
4. Many benefits and burdens of the relationship are to be shared
rather than divided and allocated
a. characteristics
In relational contracts, the parties may at the time of contracting
agree to a price that tracks a changing market or provide for "output" or
"requirements" to follow changing quantity, or may make short-term
adjustments to alleviate the burden of changed circumstances. Under
these agreements, the relationship is preserved by the agreed handshake
of cooperation, rather than fragmented by the invisible hand of self inter-
est. Put differently, provisions or incentives for flexibility and adjustment
reduce the opportunity for strategic or opportunistic behavior by one
party and tend to preserve the relationship.
b. issues
Article 2 both encourages and enforces market-tracking and risk-
sharing agreements. The problem arises when the contract extends over
time and the parties have agreed to, say, a fixed price or a fixed quantity
and have failed to provide a mechanism for excuse or adjustment. As
litigation over long-term energy contracts reveals, the tension between
seemingly fixed contract terms and changing markets has disrupted if not
proved fatal to many relationships. Moreover, the courts have rarely
granted relief. The entire financial risk, instead of being shared, is left on
the party against whom the market moved. 0 This result is consistent
with consent-based theories of contract and, perhaps, practical limita-
tions upon the judicial process.5'
49. For a lukewarm endorsement of a "cooperative model" for relational contracts, see
Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote
Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990).
50. See, eg., Harold A. Lewis, Comment, Allocating Risk in Take-or-Pay Contracts: Are
Force Majeure and Commercial Impracticability the Same Defense?, 42 Sw. L.J. 1047 (1989).
51. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (concluding that courts,
lacking sufficient information about party intent and market alternatives, are reluctant to in-
trude if parties have failed to agree). For an example of how relational contract theory might
operate, however, see Danton B. Rice & Michael A. Schlueter, Note, Deregulation and Natu-




Perhaps Article 2 should leave this problem alone, relying on the
parties to work it out. 2 On the other hand, Article 2 could stimulate the
process of bargaining without dictating the content of an adjustment. As
suggested, the conduct of the parties may generate internal norms that
support an effort to adjust despite the lack of agreement. If so, they
should be recognized. Furthermore, if the agreed term has, in light of
changed circumstances, apparently failed of its essential purpose, the
parties have been unable to agree and the aggrieved party is entitled to
some relief, 3 the court could be permitted to supply an appropriate gap-
filler term around which the parties could continue to bargain. Both of
these moves are consistent-with the characteristics of relational contracts
and respond to the dilemma posed when the parties, for whatever reason,
select a term suitable for short-term contracting for a relationship that
extends over time.
5. There may be "transaction-specific" investments
a. characteristics
The binding nature of the relationship and the cost of termination
are often enhanced when one party makes a transaction-specific invest-
ment, such as if an electrical utility, requiring a unique type of coal, re-
quires the coal mine to invest in special equipment to produce the coal.
Or, as revealed in a recent case, if the shipper of iron ore under a long-
term contract requires the carrier to invest in special equipment to load,
unload and preserve the ore.54 These investments tend to distance the
exchange from the market, increase costs and enhance incentives to pre-
serve the contract.
b. issue
Under Article 2, the presence of "transaction-specific" reliance sup-
ports a conclusion that the parties "intended to contract" even though
terms were left open or agreed price-fixing methods failed.55 Even so,
Article 2 does not single out this type of reliance for special treatment.
For example, there is no indication how reliance might (1) influence the
content of the other's good faith duties, (2) limit the power to terminate
52. Professor Scott, an experienced relationalist, would prefer to rely on patterns of coop-
erative behavior that are predicted to function rather than rely on judicial intervention. See
Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005
(1987).
53. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (providing standards for excuse in Article 2).
54. See Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio 1990).
55. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
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under UCC section 2-309(3), or (3) shape remedies for breach. By ex-
alting expectation in UCC section 1-106(1), the UCC does not begin to
tap the potential of the reliance interest as a tool to solve hard cases or a
device to facilitate the compromise settlement of business disputes.16




In relational contracts, many persons with individual and collective
poles of interest may be involved, along with entangling strands of friend-
ship, reputation, interdependence, morality and altruism. These strands
may include both parties to, and third persons who become involved with
and dependent upon, the relationship."
b. issue
If relational exchange encompasses more than just the parties to the
contract, the framework for analysis is expanded. For example, should
the interests of third persons be considered when the power to terminate
is exercised? If third persons are integrally involved in and, perhaps,
have relied upon the relationship, the termination power arguably should
take those interests into account. Similarly, if there is a "bargain of
sorts" between multiple players in the sale and distribution of goods,
with information and expectations created over a broad base of purchas-
ers, the current adherence to the privity requirement in warranty dis-
putes seems misplaced. 9 In any event, revised Article 2 might take these
factors into account in considering the treatment of various nonparties.
7. Conclusion: The content of relational default rules
a. assumptions
Assuming a relational contract for sale, two proposals and several
suggestions for the revision of Article 2 have been made. First, the
UCC's definition of agreement should be revised to clearly incorporate
56. See Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law School's
Doors, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 247, 274-87.
57. Macneil identifies two other characteristics of relational contracts that will not be
discussed here: (1) Trouble is expected as a matter of course; and (2) the relationship apart
from the exchange has independent value. The former encourages the parties to plan for
dispute resolution, and the latter helps to explain why parties in an extended relationship are
willing to share risks and engage in cooperative behavior. MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 75-76.
58. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1358 (1992) (discussing when third-party beneficiaries should be allowed to enforce contracts).
59. See Speidel, supra note 13, at 13.
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into the contract internal norms generated by the relationship. Second,
the scope and content of the good faith duty should be expanded to better
deter opportunism in both pre- and post-contract relationships. Third,
depending on the relational characteristic involved, possible responsive
revisions of the Article 2 "default" rules were discussed and suggestions
were made.
Throughout, it was assumed that the parties had power to plan for
relational contracting. Except for limitations imposed on the power to
vary the duty of good faith,' the parties' agreement on the questions
discussed would control. The probability is that many of these terms
have been left open or are to be agreed upon rather than negotiated at the
time of contracting.
Finally, I have assumed that in the absence of an agreement, most
parties to relational contracts would probably prefer gap fillers and prin-
ciples of liability and remedy that respond to relational realities. Under
this assumption, relational default rules for Article 2 will be complex
rather than simple. This latter assumption is debatable and leads us to
the current law-and-economics literature on contract default rules.
b. default rules
i. nonrelational default rules
In essence, default rules are the gap fillers and principles of forma-
tion, interpretation, performance and remedy provided by law in the ab-
sence of contrary agreement. In general, these principles should respond,
wherever possible, to transactional realities. Put differently, divergence
and contradiction between the transaction in context and contract law
should be avoided, unless law is performing an overtly regulatory
function.
One version of economic analysis deals with the efficiency of con-
tract behavior and law in discrete exchanges in "thick" markets, where
all material terms are agreed and transaction costs are assumed to be
zero. This model of analysis, like classic contract-law doctrine, works
best for more discrete transactions. Default rules built upon this model
will not work for relational contracts.61
Other economists have worked with the reality that not all agree-
ments are fully contingent, that many markets do not supply fungible
60. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
61. See Macneil, supra note 23, at 1062; see also Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Exchange:
Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 AM. BEHAV. Sm. 337 (1980) (discussing new directions
of research in economic activity).
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substitutes and that all exchange involves transaction costs. The result is
a body of scholarship devoted to the nature and effect of transaction costs
in contracts in which, because of high bargaining costs or bounded ra-
tionality, the parties are unable to reach a complete ex ante agreement.
In the absence of agreement, the question is what default rules should be
supplied by law to fill "gaps" in the agreement or to provide the basic
principles of liability, performance and remedy?62 The objective is to
provide a hypothetical ex ante bargain that, in theory at least, minimizes
various transaction costs. To the extent that an ex ante focus is relevant,
this model for default rules works better for relational contracts.
Under this model, one first determines exactly what terms and
which principles of liability and remedy the parties have power to supply,
vary or define by agreement. This is a very long list under Article 2.
Except for the duty of good faith imposed in Article 1, virtually every-
thing in Article 2 is a default rule.
The next question is what is the most efficient term or principle to be
supplied in the event that the parties reach no agreement defining a term
or varying the applicable principles. This is a matter of dispute. Should
it be a "rule" to which most parties would probably have agreed if able to
engage in costless bargaining, or should it be the "rule" that is the easiest
for the parties to bargain around? The former is a reasonable rule that
lowers transaction costs when the parties accept it without bargaining,
but increases them if the parties bargain in fact. The latter minimizes
transaction costs if the parties in fact bargain around it, but increases
them if the parties are forced to live with a rule that neither probably
would have wanted. 3 Another possibility is a "rule" that deviates from
what most parties would have wanted by requiring one party with a stra-
tegic advantage in bargaining to reveal critical information. These so-
called "penalty" default rules decrease transaction costs if important in-
formation is disclosed ex ante contracting and penalize the nondisclosing
party if it is not.6r
62. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKET AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985).
63. See Charny, supra note 22, at 1877-78. Professor Charny argues that the lawmaker
should first supply a rule that is easy to bargain around. Id. at 1877. If this is not possible, the
rule should be one with which most parties probably would have agreed and has desirable
social consequences. Id. at 1878. Although Professor Charny's discussion is limited to "gap
fillers" and rules of interpretation, the analysis has a broader scope.
64. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). For a critique, see Jason S. Johnston, Strate-
gic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
RELATIONAL SALES CONTRACTS
ii. relational default rules
Other scholars have turned their attention to default rules for rela-
tional contracts. Because of the relational characteristics, the question
shifts to what hypothetical terms or principles are most likely to reduce
transaction costs, deter opportunism and facilitate adjustment over the
duration of the relationship. Should it be a complex rule derived from
the structural relationship between the parties (an internal norm) or a
clear, categorical rule that facilitates agreement but relies, primarily, on
social rather than legal norms to promote risk sharing and adjustment?6"
The latter approach, advanced by Professor Robert Scott, is ques-
tionable for at least three reasons. First, the strict, arbitrary default rule
diverges from relational reality and, presumably, from what the parties
or those similarly situated would want. It seeks certainty through strict
rules in a transaction in which uncertainty is the rule. Second, the strict,
arbitrary default rule is selected without regard to whether the parties
can or will efficiently bargain around it. Suppose they do not. In a rela-
tionship characterized by the absence of complete ex ante agreement, the
parties are left with gap fillers and principles of liability and remedy that
do not respond to transactional reality. Third, the theory eschews legal
intervention under realistic principles to rely on assumed nonlegal incen-
tives and sanctions to influence the conduct of the parties.
Perhaps these patterns of cooperation and adjustment are more
likely to exist in relational contracts. But if they do not, the parties,
again, are left to the vicissitudes of neoclassical contract law with its ex
ante preoccupation. Put differently, in a relational contract with its con-
cern about ex post opportunistic behavior, the parties are left to the ex
ante bias of neoclassical contract law. If litigation follows, a sound rela-
tional result may be impossible, or, at best, may be achieved only by
forcing relational contract issues into the neoclassical mold.66
The two commentators respond to Johnston in Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Con-
tractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992).
65. Compare Gillette, supra note 49 (arguing for more complex rules) with Robert E.
Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597
(1990) (arguing for simple default rules).
66. The "clear rule" approach, however, might be justified by practical considerations.
For example, internal norms may rarely emerge from conduct within the relational contract
for sale. The task of devising relational default rules may, itself, be too complex. Finally,
courts appear to be reluctant to intervene in relational contracts where neither the parties nor
external norms can provide plausible solutions. See Schwartz, supra note 51.
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
Conceding the complexity of the project, at a minimum the follow-
ing steps should be taken. First, relational theory should be developed
apart from, not dependent on, the ex ante preoccupation of modem con-
tract law and most economic analysis. Second, a fresh assessment of
which principles should not be variable by private agreement should be
made. It is important to know which principles are inalienable and why,
if relational contracts are involved. The remainder, of course, will be
relational default rules. Third, default rules should be selected that re-
spond to relational reality. But as David Chamy has suggested in an-
other setting, this is more complicated than simply deciding what the
parties would have agreed if they had explicitly addressed the issue.
67
The final result may be a mix of simple and complex default rules.68 For
example, Chamy argues that a simple default rule should be selected if it
is known that subsequent parties will be in a position to bargain around
it.69 In this case, the rule will minimize transaction costs because it is
designed to induce the parties to expend their best effort in bargaining
around it. If parties are not in a position to bargain around the rule, a
more complex inquiry must be made.
In addition to considering the costs of bargaining, the more complex
default rule must be appropriate for most bargainers who will simply
accept it and modify the actual preferences or understandings of one or
both parties in a way that is socially desirable. Finally, efforts to develop
information about the nature and content of relational sales contracts
and the behavior of persons involved in those relationships should be
intensified.
V. CONCLUSION
In all probability, development of the principles and policies of rela-
tional theory will be the most important challenge and accomplishment
of twenty-first century contract law.7 0 Despite disagreement and com-
plexity, revised Article 2 should make an effort to respond to these im-
portant exchange relationships. Otherwise, the divergence between
67. See Charny, supra note 22, at 1878.
68. Id. at 1877-78.
69. Id. at 1877.
70. See generally Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role
of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 697, 739 (1990) (discussing communitarian dimen-
sions of contract law and concluding that in "legal activities of interpreting and supplying
contract terms, we should be wary of approaches that sacrifice norms of trust, cooperation and
participation for supposed short-term gains").
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transactional reality and the law of sales will continue to grow, with pre-
dictable damage to the utility and integrity of Article 2.
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